American University Law Review
Volume 62 | Issue 3

Article 6

2013

Who's Standing in the District After Grayson v.
AT&T Corp.? The Applicability of the Case-orControversy Requirement in D.C. Courts
John W. Curran
American University Washington College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Curran, John W. "Who's Standing in the District After Grayson v. AT&T Corp.? The Applicability of the Case-or-Controversy
Requirement in D.C. Courts." American University Law Review 62, no.3 (2013): 739-762.

This Notes & Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Who's Standing in the District After Grayson v. AT&T Corp.? The
Applicability of the Case-or-Controversy Requirement in D.C. Courts

This notes & casenotes is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol62/iss3/6

CURRAN.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2/28/2013 1:18 PM

NOTES
WHO’S STANDING IN THE DISTRICT AFTER
GRAYSON V. AT&T CORP.? THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE CASE-ORCONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT IN D.C.
COURTS
JOHN W. CURRAN*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................................................................ 740
I. Background .............................................................................. 741
A. Congressional Power over D.C. ........................................ 741
B. Modern-Day D.C. Courts ................................................... 743
1. Congressional creation of Article I courts in the
District .......................................................................... 743
2. Palmore and the constitutionality of Article I D.C.
courts ............................................................................ 746
3. Congress can legislate over D.C. free from Article
III constraints ............................................................... 746
C. Standing Requirements in Federal Court ........................ 748
D. D.C. Court Discussions of the Case-or-Controversy
Requirement ...................................................................... 750
II. D.C. Courts Exist Unencumbered by the Case-orControversy Requirement ........................................................ 754
A. CPPA and Grayson History ................................................. 754
B. Grayson II Ducks the Question, Throwing Precedent
Into Doubt ......................................................................... 756
* Managing Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 62; J.D. candidate,
May 2013, American University Washington College of Law; B.A., Government, Colby College,
May 2009. I would like to thank Professor Stephen Vladeck for his guidance
throughout the writing process and Pasha Sternberg, Estefania San Juan, Ali Vissichelli,
and Kat Scott for their meticulous edits. Above all, thanks to my parents and Nanny,
without you none of this would have been possible. I hope I made you proud.

739

CURRAN.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

740

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/28/2013 1:18 PM

[Vol. 62:739

C. Section 11-705(b) Does Not Incorporate Article III’s
Case-or-Controversy Requirement .................................... 757
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 762

INTRODUCTION
In Grayson v. AT&T Corp. (Grayson II),1 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals sitting en banc held that a D.C. statute that
purportedly granted individuals standing without suffering an injuryin-fact did not actually do so.2 The court rested on tenuous grounds
and held as a matter of statutory interpretation and legislative history
that the D.C. Council did not make explicit its intent to overrule
years of the court’s standing requirements.3 In doing so, the court
avoided a clear opportunity to answer the question of whether the
Article III case-or-controversy requirement applies in D.C. courts.
Long-established precedent holds that Article III standing
requirements do not apply in state courts and courts of the
territories.4 The local D.C. court system is an anomaly in the United
States because it is intended to function as a state court system, but
D.C.’s unique nature as a federal enclave implicates constitutional
issues that do not encumber state courts.5 Section 11-705(b) of the
D.C. Code appears to be an inconspicuous section governing the
logistical administration of the D.C. Court of Appeals, but courts have
interpreted its language that “[c]ases and controversies shall be heard
and determined by divisions of the court”6 to statutorily incorporate
Article III standing requirements into the D.C. courts. This Note
addresses the question that the D.C. Court of Appeals avoided7: Does

1. 15 A.3d 219 (D.C. 2011) (en banc).
2. Id. at 224; see D.C. CODE § 28-3905(k)(1) (2001).
3. Grayson II, 15 A.3d at 238.
4. See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1988) (“[T]he
special limitations that Article III of the Constitution imposes on the jurisdiction of
the federal courts are not binding on the state courts.”); Life of the Land v. Land Use
Comm’n, 623 P.2d 431, 438 (Haw. 1981) (“[T]he courts of Hawaii are not subject to
a ‘cases or controversies’ limitation like that imposed upon the federal judiciary by
Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution . . . .”).
5. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973) (discussing Congress’s
plenary power over D.C. provided by Article I’s proscription that Congress may
“exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over” D.C. (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17)).
6. D.C. CODE § 11-705(b) (2001) (emphasis added).
7. See Bruce Comly French, Broadened Concepts of Standing in the Local District of
Columbia Courts, 23 HOW. L.J. 255, 263 (1980) (“[T]he question of a full-blown
analysis of the standing doctrine in the District of Columbia local courts has not been
undertaken . . . .”).
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the D.C. Code statutorily incorporate Article III standing
requirements?
Part I of this Note examines Congress’s plenary power over D.C.
and traces the creation of the modern-day D.C. court system as
Article I courts. It then examines Congress’s analogous power over
the territories pursuant to Article IV, focusing on the power’s plenary
nature and Congress’s extraordinary ability to legislate free from
other constitutional restraints. Finally, Part I discusses Article III
standing rules, which create federal courts of limited jurisdiction, and
inconsistent jurisprudence regarding the applicability of standing
requirements in D.C. courts. Part II examines the history of the
Grayson cases and the D.C. Council’s attempt to convey standing
without injury-in-fact. After analyzing the legislative history of section
11-705(b), implications of the courts’ nature as courts of general
jurisdiction, and the policies behind Article III standing, this Note
concludes that Congress did not statutorily incorporate the case-orcontroversy requirement.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Congressional Power over D.C.
Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution grants
Congress plenary power over the District of Columbia.8 This broad
grant of power means that Congress serves the role of both state and
federal government in D.C.9 This permits Congress to regulate
conduct in D.C. that it could not regulate in the national arena and
allows Congress to exercise police powers and act as a state legislature
might.10 This includes the ability to establish a judicial system,
provided that Congress does not violate any other constitutional

8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (providing that Congress shall have power “[t]o
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not
exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the
Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States”);
Palmore, 411 U.S. at 397 (stating that Congress’s plenary authority in the District
includes police and regulatory powers normally exercised by state governments).
9. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 619 (1838)
(holding that in D.C. “[t]here is . . . no division of powers between the general and
state governments”).
10. See Palmore, 411 U.S. at 397–98 (distinguishing Congress’s power to legislate
pursuant to clause 17 from its powers to legislate pursuant to its other section 8
powers); Mark S. Scarberry, Historical Considerations and Congressional Representation for
the District of Columbia: Constitutionality of the D.C. House Voting Rights Bill in Light of
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment and the History of the Creation of the District, 60
ALA. L. REV. 783, 806–07 (2009) (observing that Congress has “the same kind of
plenary power that a state legislature possesses” when legislating for D.C.).
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limitation on its authority.11 Although Congress may act similarly to a
state legislature, the Court has long held that D.C. is distinct from the
states.12
Congress’s power over D.C. is in many ways analogous to its power
over the territories pursuant to Article IV.13 In American Insurance Co.
v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter),14 Chief Justice Marshall held that
territorial courts created pursuant to Congress’s plenary power under
Article IV were “legislative Courts” rather than “constitutional Courts”
and thus did not exercise the judicial power of the United States, but
could nonetheless exercise jurisdiction over matters enumerated in
Article III.15 Because Congress acted pursuant to its Article IV powers
to regulate the territories, these courts were not constrained by
Article III and therefore could consist of judges lacking life tenure.16
In so ruling, Chief Justice Marshall focused on the unique nature of
Congress’s authority over the territories as the “combined powers of
the general, and of a state government.”17 This ruling applied only to
the territories and left unanswered the question of whether other
non-Article III federal courts also faced a similar lack of
constriction.18
Subsequent courts have clarified and elaborated on the meaning of
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Canter. Justice Harlan, speaking
for a plurality of the Court in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,19 explained that
the practical realities of governing the territories coupled with weak
territorial governments meant that judges appointed by Congress of
11. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5 (1899) (establishing that Congress
“may vest and distribute the judicial authority in and among courts . . . as it may
think fit, so long as it does not contravene any provision of the constitution”).
12. See Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 452–53 (1805) (holding that
D.C. residents could not bring a diversity suit in federal court because they are not
citizens of a state as the Constitution uses the term). The Court in National Mutual
Insurance Co. of District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949),
upheld the constitutionality of Congress’s expansion of diversity jurisdiction to
permit suit by D.C. residents. The Court fractured in its reasoning, with Justice
Jackson joined by Justices Black and Burton arguing that the District Clause enabled
Congress to legislate beyond the nine heads of judicial power expressed in Article III.
Id. at 600 (plurality opinion). Justices Rutledge and Murphy argued that D.C. was
encompassed within Article III. Id. at 625–26 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
13. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States . . . .”).
14. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
15. Id. at 546.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Kenneth G. Coffin, Limiting Legislative Courts: Protecting Article III from
Article I Evisceration, 16 BARRY L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (posing questions left unanswered by
Canter).
19. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).

CURRAN.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/28/2013 1:18 PM

WHO’S STANDING IN THE DISTRICT AFTER GRAYSON

743

necessity heard many cases that otherwise would have been heard by
state courts.20 Justice Harlan’s language that “[w]hen the peculiar
reasons justifying investiture of judges with limited tenure have not
been present, the Canter holding has not been deemed controlling”
indicates that Article III’s requirements do not categorically apply in
non-Article III courts.21 The Court has subsequently held that D.C. is
another such area where these “peculiar reasons” are present.22
B. Modern-Day D.C. Courts
1.

Congressional creation of Article I courts in the District
The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure
Act of 197023 created the Article I D.C. Superior Court and the D.C.
Court of Appeals.24 The Act bifurcated the previously unified court
system in D.C. into separate court systems, modeled after the federalstate court system.25 Congress created the Article III Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit and the federal district court with jurisdiction
over matters of national concern, while the Article I D.C. Superior
Court and D.C. Court of Appeals were limited to cases of local
concern.26 Congress intended for the local D.C. courts to function
similarly to state courts, that is, outside the purview of Article III.27 As
20. Id. at 545 (plurality opinion).
21. Id. at 548 (citing O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933)).
22. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 409–10 (1973) (holding that life
tenure and salary protections do not apply in the local D.C. courts established
pursuant to Article I).
23. Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the D.C. CODE).
24. D.C. CODE § 11-101(2) (2001) (stating that the courts were “established
pursuant to [A]rticle I of the Constitution”); H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 44 (1970)
(“This title makes clear (section 11-101) that the District of Columbia Courts . . . are
Article I courts, created pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States
Constitution, and not Article III courts.”); S. REP. NO. 91-405, at 18 (1969) (“The
specific reference to the constitutional authority for the creation of the respective
court systems makes clear that [A]rticle I, section 8, clause 16 [sic], is relied upon for
the creation of [the local D.C. Courts].”).
25. H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 35 (providing that there will be a “Federal-State court
system in the District of Columbia analogous to court systems in the several States”).
26. See Palmore, 411 U.S. at 408 (discussing Congress’s intent to remedy the
problem of a unified court system unable to effectively service local and national
concerns by creating two court systems with separate jurisdictions).
27. See Hickey v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 457 F. Supp. 584, 586 (D.D.C. 1978)
(“The D.C. Court of Appeals is the highest court of the District of Columbia, and its
status is that of a state supreme court.”); see also S. REP. NO. 91-405, at 18 (“By creating
the local courts under authority granted by [A]rticle I of the Constitution, the local
District of Columbia court structure is not bound by the provisions found in [A]rticle
III of the Constitution.”); Wesley S. Williams, Jr., District of Columbia Court
Reorganization, 1970, 59 GEO L.J. 477, 490 (1971) (discussing how Congress intended
to “free the [A]rticle I local court system from the judicial tenure constraint in
[A]rticle III”). The driving intent of the D.C. court system was to reduce the extreme

CURRAN.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

744

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/28/2013 1:18 PM

[Vol. 62:739

part of the bifurcation, the local court judges were explicitly not
afforded life tenure, an inescapable aspect of Article III courts.28
Congress’s distinction between the Article I and Article III courts
operating in D.C. was intentional.29
To enable the local D.C. courts to function as courts of general
jurisdiction similar to state courts, Congress granted the D.C.
Superior Court the power to hear “any civil action or other matter (at
law or in equity) brought in the District of Columbia”30 and invested
the D.C. Court of Appeals with appellate jurisdiction.31 The Supreme
Court exercises appellate jurisdiction over the D.C. Court of Appeals
in the same manner as state supreme courts, further evincing
Congress’s intent to treat the D.C. courts analogously to state courts.32
Within the subchapter labeled “Continuation and Organization” of
the D.C. Court of Appeals is a curious section labeled “Assignment of
judges; divisions; hearings.”33 Section 11-705(b) states: “Cases and
controversies shall be heard and determined by divisions of the court
unless a hearing or a rehearing before the court in banc is
ordered.”34 The legislative history of section 11-705(b) in the Court
Reform Act is not illuminative on its face, with both the House and
Senate Reports stating that it was a “recodification” of prior law
providing for the assignment of judges, divisions, and hearings.35
The section was originally enacted in 1967 when the number of
judges on the then Article III D.C. Court of Appeals was increased
from two to five.36 The legislative history of the original enactment
indicates that Congress intended to provide some measure of relief to
the beleaguered and backlogged court system by increasing the
number of judges on the court.37 In an effort to increase the court’s
backlog of criminal cases that had developed under the previous unified system. See
H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 3 (describing Congress’s motivation to reduce the high rate
of crime that resulted from a court system unable to handle its caseload).
28. H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 38; S. REP. NO. 91-405, at 8; see also Palmore, 411 U.S.
at 409–10 (confirming Congress’s power to enact such a provision).
29. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 408 (describing these as “a wholly separate court system”).
30. D.C. CODE § 1-204.31(a) (2001); D.C. CODE § 11-921 (2001); see also Note,
Federal and Local Jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, 92 YALE L.J. 292, 299 n.27 (1982)
(describing D.C. courts as “quasi-state courts of general jurisdiction, without any
attributes of Article III courts”).
31. D.C. CODE § 11-721 (granting the court jurisdiction over appeals from “all
final orders and judgments of the Superior Court”).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (providing that the D.C. Court of Appeals is
treated as a “highest court of a State” for purposes of Supreme Court certiorari).
33. D.C. CODE § 11-705.
34. Id. § 11-705(b) (emphasis added).
35. H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 134 (1970); S. REP. NO. 91-405, at 20 (1969).
36. Act of Dec. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-178, § 1(3)(A), 81 Stat. 544, 545.
37. H.R. REP. NO. 90-378, at 3–4 (1967) (describing the additional judges as
“imperative” to a smooth court system); S. REP. NO. 90-802, at 3 (1967) (focusing on
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efficiency even further, Congress permitted the court to sit as a panel
of three judges instead of requiring all five.38 In passing this section,
Congress’s focus appeared to be on the latter half of the sentence—
permitting panels of three judges.39 The two congressional reports
accompanying the bill used the phrase “cases and controversies” one
time each and provided no further explanation or analysis of the
words. Instead, the reports devote their discussion to the newly
created panel system.40
In 1973, Congress passed the District of Columbia Self-Government
and Governmental Reorganization Act,41 delegating some of
Congress’s plenary power to a newly created D.C. Council and
Mayor.42 Although Congress delegated many powers to the D.C.
Council, it explicitly prohibited the D.C. Council from legislating in
several areas, including over the organization and jurisdiction of the
judiciary.43 Congress also retained an ultimate veto over most laws
passed by the D.C. Council, with laws only taking effect after
presentment to both Houses and the passage of thirty days during
which Congress is in session without passing a joint resolution
disproving of the act.44

the increased number of judges as a response to the court’s consistently
overburdened caseload).
38. H.R. REP. NO. 90-378, at 3–4 (reporting that other courts utilize the division
system “to keep up with their work”); S. REP. NO. 90-802, at 3 (expressing the intent
to allow the court to “eliminate its present backlog and to keep its docket current”).
39. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-378, at 1 (“This expanded court is to be separated into
divisions consisting of three judges each, for hearing and determining cases and
controversies, except when a hearing or a rehearing is ordered before the court in
banc.”); S. REP. NO. 90-802, at 1 (same).
40. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-378; S. REP. NO. 90-802; see also Williams, supra note 27, at
490 (indicating that Congress may have “intended to avoid the case or controversy
constraint” in enacting the courts).
41. Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the D.C. CODE).
42. See D.C. CODE §§ 1-201.01 to -207.71 (2001).
43. Id. § 1-206.02(a)(4) (“The Council shall have no authority to . . . [e]nact any
act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provision of Title 11 (relating to
organization and jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts) . . . .”); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 93-482, at 1008 (1973) (stating the Congress intended to prohibit the D.C.
Council from “changing Title 11 of the D.C. Code providing for the organization,
administration and jurisdiction of the District Courts”).
44. D.C. CODE § 1-206.02(c)(1). The D.C. Code is considered a law of the United
States because it is passed by Congress, regardless of its limited geographical
application. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400 (1973) (making no
distinction between acts passed by Congress that are codified in the U.S. Code and
those codified in the D.C. Code). But see Note, supra note 30, at 294 (arguing that
the D.C. Code should not be considered federal law because Congress is not acting
in its national legislative capacity).
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Palmore and the constitutionality of Article I D.C. courts
In Palmore v. United States,45 the Court addressed a challenge to the
constitutionality of the newly created D.C. court system.46 The Court
rejected a criminal defendant’s claim that his trial before judges
lacking Article III tenure and salary protections violated his due
process rights and upheld the constitutionality of judges of the D.C.
courts to hear criminal cases arising under the D.C. Code.47 The
Court built upon the decision in Canter that allowed territorial courts
created pursuant to Article IV and courts-martial to operate outside
the strictures of Article III.48
Justice White drew a distinction between laws of national
applicability, which require Article III protections, and laws passed
pursuant to Congress’s power to legislate for “specialized areas having
particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment.”49 Keying
on Congress’s concerted intent to create a local court system that
functioned like state courts—including judges without life tenure—
and the historical ability of state courts to hear federal criminal cases,
the Court held that Congress acted constitutionally when it created
Article I D.C. courts staffed by judges lacking Article III tenure and
salary protections.50 Although Palmore establishes that Article III,
section 1 does not apply to D.C. courts, it did not explicitly address
the applicability of Article III, section II, including the case-orcontroversy requirement.

2.

3.

Congress can legislate over D.C. free from Article III constraints
The Court has examined the reach of Palmore’s holding in
subsequent cases involving the constitutionality of other legislative
courts. Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.51 discussed Congress’s power
to create bankruptcy courts staffed by judges lacking life tenure
empowered to hear matters “arising in or related to” the underlying
bankruptcy case.52 The Court fractured in its reasoning, but held that
45. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
46. Id. at 390.
47. Id. at 410.
48. Id. at 402–04 (citing United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955);
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828)); see also Coffin, supra note 18, at 7–8 (analyzing
Justice White’s opinion in Palmore as depending upon Chief Justice Marshall’s theory
in Canter that Congress can exercise police power over the territories and D.C.).
49. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 408.
50. See id. at 401–02, 408–10 (implying that the historical fact of federal
prosecution in state court is dispositive as to its constitutionality).
51. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
52. Id. at 53–54 (plurality opinion).
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the bankruptcy courts were unconstitutional because they were
composed of non-Article III judges who exercised Article III judicial
power.53 Noting that the Court in Canter and Palmore established that
Congress can create legislative courts that are an “exception from the
general prescription of Art[icle] III,”54 Justice Brennan limited those
holdings based on the courts’ geographic location “outside the States
of the Federal Union” and Congress’s “exceptional constitutional
grants of power” in those areas.55
Justice Brennan focused his analysis on the extraordinary powers
granted to Congress in the District Clause, the clause granting
Congress power over the Armed Forces, and Article IV, as compared
to the limited nature of Congress’s other grants of authority in Article
I, section 8.56 The Court ultimately held that Congress acted
unconstitutionally when it created the bankruptcy court system
because these historical exceptions were not present.57 This analysis
clarified that when legislating for D.C., Congress utilizes a power
“different in kind from the other broad powers conferred on
Congress.”58
Justice Brennan further limited the language in Canter and Palmore
granting Congress plenary power over “specialized areas having
particularized needs”59 as applying only to “geographic areas, such as
the District of Columbia.”60 The limited geographic applicability of
the D.C. Code and laws governing the territories, as opposed to the

53. Id. at 76.
54. Id. at 64–65 & n.16 (explaining that Congress was empowered to create
courts “not in conformity with Art[icle] III”).
55. Id. at 70–71 & n.25.
56. Id. at 73–74 & n.27; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 589 n.3
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (contrasting Congress’s plenary power under
Article I, section 8, clause 17 with its limited power under the Commerce Clause);
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 261 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[U]nlike the District Clause,
which empowers Congress ‘[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation,’ the language of the
Commerce Clause gives no indication of exclusivity.” (citation omitted)); Palmore v.
United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397–98 (1973) (“[T]he power of Congress under Clause
17 permits it to legislate for the District in a manner with respect to subjects that
would exceed its powers, or at least would be very unusual, in the context of national
legislation enacted under other powers delegated to it under Art[icle] I, § 8.”).
57. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 73–74 & n.27 (plurality opinion).
58. Id. at 76; see also Palmore, 411 U.S. at 397 (“Congress may . . . exercise all the
police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government
would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 619 (1838) (“There is in this district, no division of
powers between the general and state governments. Congress has the entire control
over the district for every purpose of government . . . .”).
59. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 408.
60. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 75–76 (plurality opinion) (labeling D.C. as a “unique
federal enclave”).
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“laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern” that
Congress attempted to authorize the bankruptcy courts to entertain,
further solidified the distinction.61 This plenary power allows
Congress to legislate over D.C. completely independent of Article III.
C. Standing Requirements in Federal Court
Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to hearing cases
and controversies.62 This doctrine, known as standing, circumscribes
the ability of federal courts to entertain suits.63 Standing is largely a
question of whether a particular plaintiff is entitled to have a court
decide the merits of a particular dispute or issue.64 The Supreme
Court has interpreted standing to encompass both constitutional and
prudential limitations on the jurisdiction of federal courts.65
The constitutional aspects of standing mandated by Article III
involve examining whether the plaintiff has demonstrated the
existence of a case or controversy between himself and the
defendant.66
There are three constitutional requirements for
standing in Article III courts.67 First, the plaintiff must personally
suffer an injury-in-fact, which is the invasion of a recognized interest
that is both “concrete and particularized” and also actual or
imminent.68 Second, there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the defendant, such that the plaintiff’s injury is “fairly
traceable” to the defendant’s conduct.69 Third, it must be likely that
a favorable judgment will redress the injury.70

61. Id. at 76.
62. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
63. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531
(3d ed. 2012) (stating that standing functions to prevent courts from ruling on certain
claims).
64. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
65. See id. (stating that the “inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on
federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise”).
66. See id. (labeling this “the threshold question in every federal case” (emphasis
added)).
67. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742–43 (1995).
68. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Compare Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184–85 (2000) (holding
that plaintiffs in an environmental organization did have standing because they
alleged direct injury to their personal interests), with Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 739–41 (1972) (denying standing to an environmental organization seeking to
prevent the construction of a ski resort because the pleading did not allege that the
construction would personally injure the organization’s members).
69. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 757–58 (1984) (holding that the plaintiffs’
injury was not fairly traceable to the defendant because the injury was “highly
indirect and result[ed] from the independent action of some third party” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522–23
(2007) (concluding that a plaintiff had standing when it alleged that its property
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Additionally, there are “judicially self-imposed limits” on federal
court jurisdiction, known as prudential standing requirements.71 The
prudential aspects include a prohibition on asserting the rights of
others,72 the requirement of individualized harm rather than a
“generalized grievance,”73 and the requirement that the plaintiff is
within the zone of interests to be protected.74 Prudential standing
requirements can be overridden by Congress and can be granted to
the full extent of Article III,75 while the Article III elements cannot be
abrogated by an act of Congress.76
The paramount policy rationale underlying the Court’s standing
jurisprudence is the separation of powers.77 This necessitates
granting federal courts limited jurisdiction to ensure that the courts
do not intrude on matters best decided by the political branches as a
democratic principle78 and as a matter of competency.79 The

interests were harmed by the EPA’s refusal to enforce greenhouse gas emission laws
because the injury could be traced to the EPA).
70. See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 505–06 (denying standing because economic
realities made it unlikely that plaintiffs would benefit from a judgment invalidating
the challenged exclusionary zoning provision).
71. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
72. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128–29 (2004) (requiring that the
plaintiff assert a claim on his own behalf).
73. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19–20, 23 (1998) (determining that a suit
brought pursuant to a statute that authorized suit by “any party aggrieved” by an
agency order did not present a generalized grievance because Congress created a
statutory right and its violation by the defendant was sufficient to present a
personalized injury).
74. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970) (establishing that the plaintiff must fall within the group of people the law
was intended to protect in order to establish standing).
75. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979)
(explaining that Congress can expand standing beyond that ordinarily barred by
prudential standing rules); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (“Congress may grant an express
right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing
rules.”).
76. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997) (“It is settled that Congress
cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to
sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”).
77. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of Article III
standing is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”).
78. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 (reflecting on the “proper—and properly
limited—role of the courts in a democratic society”); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
95 (1968) (explaining that the case-or-controversy requirement helps to “define
the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power”).
79. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (emphasizing that the political branches are better
suited to decide matters of general significance that are not presented in the context
of injured individuals); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 63, § 3531.3 (discussing proper
limitations on the courts as a function of courts’ unrepresentative identity and
inadequacy in addressing certain issues as compared to the political branches).
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doctrine of separation of powers prevents Congress from using the
courts as a vehicle to indirectly trample on the executive branch.80
Article III standing requirements do not apply in state and local
territorial courts.81 Separation of powers concerns are absent when
the claim is brought in state court because of the separate protections
All states have a court of general
provided by federalism.82
jurisdiction to entertain claims beyond that which a federal court can
hear.83 This allows state courts, as courts of general jurisdiction, to
hear a wider range of claims as an original matter.84
D. D.C. Court Discussions of the Case-or-Controversy Requirement
The D.C. Court of Appeals has provided widely inconsistent
jurisprudence regarding the applicability of Article III standing
requirements in D.C. courts. Supreme Court precedent indicates
that Article III does not apply of its own force in D.C. courts, so the
requirement would have to come from another source.85 Therefore,
80. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 890–97 (1983) (decrying Congress’s
increased use of the relaxed definition of standing to indirectly circumvent
separation of powers by empowering a greater range of individuals to challenge
executive actions in the courts). Additional policy reasons for standing include the
preservation of scarce judicial resources and the related concept that injured parties
have sufficient motivation to present the court with the necessary advocacy. See
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (opining that plaintiffs who assert their
own rights will come to court with “the necessary zeal and appropriate presentation”
that might otherwise be lacking); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.1
(6th ed. 2012) (discussing the desire to expend judicial resources only to address an
aggrieved party).
81. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 113 (1983) (“[S]tate courts need
not impose the same standing or remedial requirements that govern federal-court
proceedings.”); see, e.g., ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 188 P.3d 1222, 1225–
26 (N.M. 2008) (“Under the New Mexico Constitution, state courts are courts of
general jurisdiction, and our constitution contains no analogue to the federal ‘cases
and controversies’ language.”); Benavente v. Taitano, 2006 Guam 15 ¶ 17 (“[T]he
Organic Act of Guam provides no express case or controversy requirement similar to
the standing requirements found in Article III.”).
82. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (observing that “the
constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts
are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy” because the “allocation of
authority in the federal system” provides a comparable check to separation of
powers).
83. See Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State
Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1163 & n.76 (1984) (describing how almost all
states have a court with original jurisdiction over all matters at law and equity).
84. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)
(describing federal courts as “courts of limited jurisdiction”); Heather Elliott,
Congress’s Inability To Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 209 n.300 (2011)
(“Article III courts are not courts of general jurisdiction the way state courts
are . . . .”).
85. See French, supra note 7, at 267 (emphasizing that the case-or-controversy
requirement is not constitutionally mandated and so must be statutorily imposed).
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the uncertainty largely revolves around whether section 11-705(b) of
the D.C. Code statutorily incorporated the case-or-controversy
requirement.86
The first D.C. court to cite section 11-705(b) was United States v.
Cummings,87 which stated that D.C. courts were limited to hearing
cases and controversies.88 The following year, after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Palmore, the D.C. Court of Appeals stated that
D.C. courts “are not bound by the requirements of Article III,” but
the court implied that its jurisdiction “extends as far as Congress has
granted it.”89 The court, however, refused to answer the question of
the extent of Congress’s grant of jurisdiction.90 The language of the
court that it was following the principles of standing, justiciability,
and mootness “to promote sound judicial economy” reflects the view
that standing requirements were adopted wholly as a prudential
matter rather than statutorily mandated.91
Later courts began to cite section 11-705(b) as indicating that
Congress statutorily incorporated Article III standing requirements in
D.C. courts.92 In Lee v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals & Review,93
the court took it as a natural progression that because D.C. courts
were constrained by a case-or-controversy requirement, it was wise to

86. See supra notes 33–40 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of
section 11-705(b)).
87. 301 A.2d 229 (D.C. 1973) (per curiam).
88. Id. at 231.
89. District of Columbia v. Walters, 319 A.2d 332, 338 n.13 (D.C. 1974).
90. See id. (citing prior cases that did not “examin[e] the limits of this grant” and
not doing so itself).
91. See id. (differentiating the two requirements). The Walters court did not cite
to section 11-705(b) in support of the statement that Congress granted limited
jurisdiction to D.C. courts. See Lee v. D.C. Bd. of Appeals & Review, 423 A.2d 210,
216 n.13 (D.C. 1980) (observing in a parenthetical citation to Walters that the Walters
court did not cite to section 11-705(b) in support of the statement that Congress
granted limited jurisdiction to D.C. courts).
92. See, e.g., Friends of Tilden Park, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 806 A.2d 1201,
1206 (D.C. 2002) (applying the case-or-controversy requirement despite
acknowledging that the court was not established under Article III (citing D.C. CODE
§ 11-705(b)); Fisher v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 762 A.2d 35, 38 n.7 (D.C. 2000) (stating
that the court is bound to hear only cases and controversies by “our own governing
statute”); Cmty. Credit Union Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Express Servs. Corp., 534 A.2d 331,
333 (D.C. 1987) (“Although this court is not governed by standing requirements
under [A]rticle III of the Constitution, we look to federal jurisprudence to define the
limits of ‘[c]ases and controversies’ that our enabling statute empowers us to hear.”
(second alteration in original)); Lee, 423 A.2d at 216 n.13 (“In creating this court . . .
Congress provided that we, like the federal courts, should hear only ‘[c]ases and
controversies.’” (alteration in original) (citing D.C. CODE § 11-705(b))); Kopff v.
D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 381 A.2d 1372, 1378 n.11 (D.C. 1977)
(“[O]ur jurisdiction is limited by the same ‘case or controversy’ requirement, see
D.C. CODE § 11-705(b), as that imposed on the Article III courts . . . .”).
93. 423 A.2d 210 (D.C. 1980).
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also adopt the Supreme Court’s standing tests.94 Courts subsequently
expounded upon this view and paralleled the case-or-controversy
requirement in section 11-705(b) that allegedly binds D.C. courts to
the Article III provision that binds federal courts.95 These courts
established that D.C. standing principles encompass two aspects:
Article III requirements incorporated via section 11-705(b) and
prudential principles that the D.C. courts adopted.96
Other courts have expressly contradicted these statements,
declaring that standing in D.C. is purely a prudential matter. In
Banks v. Ferrell97 the court noted that it is “true that the judicial power
of the local D.C. courts may extend beyond the case or controversy
requirement.”98 Elsewhere, the court has stated that it “generally
adhere[s] to the case and controversy requirement,”99 but that it is
not bound by either the Article III standing requirements in
general100 or the case-or-controversy requirement in particular.101
This confusion regarding which⎯if any⎯aspects of Article III

94. See id. at 216 n.13 (labeling the adoption of the injury-in-fact requirement as
a “logical and appropriate component in the test for standing before this court”).
95. Cmty. Credit Union, 534 A.2d at 333 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982)); see also
Friends of Tilden Park, 806 A.2d at 1206–07 & n.5 (distinguishing between
constitutional standing and prudential principles).
96. See Speyer v. Barry, 588 A.2d 1147, 1160 (D.C. 1991) (stating that plaintiffs
must meet “both the ‘constitutional’ requirement of a ‘case or controversy’ and the
‘prudential’ prerequisites of standing”).
97. 411 A.2d 54 (D.C. 1979).
98. Id. at 56 n.7; see also S. REP. NO. 91-405, at 18 (1969) (“By creating the local
courts under authority granted by [A]rticle I of the Constitution, the local District of
Columbia court structure is not bound by the provisions found in [A]rticle III of the
Constitution.”).
99. Riverside Hosp. v. D.C. Dep’t of Health, 944 A.2d 1098, 1103–04 (D.C. 2008);
see also Cropp v. Williams, 841 A.2d 328, 330 (D.C. 2004) (per curiam) (stating that
the court is “not bound strictly by the ‘case or controversy’ requirements of Article
III”); District of Columbia v. Grp. Ins. Admin., 633 A.2d 2, 12 (D.C. 1993)
(“Although we, unlike the federal courts, are not bound by the ‘case or controversy’
requirement of Article III of the Constitution, we have adopted this requirement for
prudential reasons . . . .”).
100. Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A.2d 702, 706 n.4 (D.C. 2009)
(“[T]he standing requirements of Article III of the U.S. Constitution do not govern
the jurisdiction of our courts.”).
101. Bd. of Dirs. of the Wash. City Orphan Asylum v. Bd. of Trs. of the Wash. City
Orphan Asylum, 798 A.2d 1068, 1074 (D.C. 2002) (“[T]his court is not bound by
‘case or controversy’ requirements set forth in Article III.”); see also Consumer Fed’n
of Am. v. Upjohn Co., 346 A.2d 725, 727 n.6 (D.C. 1975) (“[T]he rules of standing as
applied in the federal courts are substantially the same as those which govern the
instant case in Superior Court.” (emphasis added)). While it is possible that these
courts were referring to the absence of a constitutional requirement rather a
statutory mandate, the lack of consistency and clarity nonetheless clouds the issue.
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standing are mandated by statute and which have been prudentially
adopted by the court has left the area greatly unsettled.102
The D.C. Court of Appeals has made it clear that it is not bound by
Supreme Court precedent regarding justiciability and can hear cases
that would be barred from adjudication in Article III courts. For
example, courts have admitted that they have the power to issue
advisory opinions,103 rule on moot cases,104 and decide cases not yet
ripe.105 Additionally, the D.C. Council may provide a right of action
that would otherwise be barred by the courts’ prudential standing
rules.106
Descriptions of the Superior Court as a court of general
jurisdiction further muddle the matter. The D.C. Code provides that
the Superior Court has jurisdiction over “any civil action or other
matter,”107 leading to the label of the Superior Court as a “court of
general jurisdiction.”108 Legislative history of the D.C. Courts Act also
includes a reference to the Superior Court as a court of general
jurisdiction.109 When coupled with Congress’s intent to create the
D.C. courts in the image of state courts, the purported case-orcontroversy limitation to the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction raises
major questions about the true extent of the D.C. courts’ jurisdiction.

102. See Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219, 260 n.9 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (Ruiz, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Our opinions have not all adhered to
the distinction between what is mandated and what we, by choice, require.”); Grayson
I, 980 A.2d 1137, 1155 n.78 (D.C. 2009) (“[T]his court is not bound by the case or
controversy requirement of Article III.”), rev’d en banc, 15 A.3d 219; see also Andrew
Kim, Note, “Standing” in the Way of Equality? The Myth of Proponent Standing and the
Jurisdictional Error in Perry v. Brown, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1867, 1885 n.134 (2012)
(stating that D.C. “subscribes to Article III principles of justiciability”).
103. See Clayton v. United States, 429 A.2d 1381, 1384 (D.C. 1981) (expressing
“reluctance to render an advisory opinion” on prudential grounds but implying that
the court nonetheless retained the power to hear them).
104. See Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C. 1989) (en banc) (“[T]he
decisions of the Supreme Court on the issue of mootness are not binding on this
court.”).
105. See Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 572 n.17 (D.C. 1992) (exercising the
court’s “flexibility” and “discretion” to decide a ripeness issue).
106. See Exec. Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 732–33
(D.C. 2000) (holding that the D.C. Council had the power to enact a statute that
overrides the prudential standing limits imposed by D.C. courts); cf. supra note 75
and accompanying text (recognizing Congress’s power to override the Supreme
Court’s prudential standing requirements).
107. D.C. CODE § 11-921(a)(6) (2001).
108. E.g., Cormier v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 959 A.2d 658, 664 n.3 (D.C.
2008); Andrade v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 990, 992 (D.C. 1979); see Williams, supra note 27,
at 484 (describing the D.C. court system as one of “general jurisdiction”).
109. H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 33 (1970).
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II. D.C. COURTS EXIST UNENCUMBERED BY THE CASE-ORCONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT
A. CPPA and Grayson History
The D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act110 (CPPA) is a
consumer protection statute designed to protect against unfair trade
practices.111 Prior to 2000, the CPPA permitted suit by “[a]ny
consumer who suffers any damage” from an illegal trade practice.112
Under this version, the complainant must be a consumer who
personally suffered some damage.113 In 2000, the CPPA was amended
to provide that “[a] person, whether acting for the interests of itself,
its members, or the general public, may bring an action under this
chapter.”114 On its face, this amendment could be interpreted as
removing the injury-in-fact requirement from CPPA suits by
permitting suit by any person whenever an unfair trade practice
injures D.C. consumers, regardless of whether the complainant was
personally injured.115
This amendment raised two separate
questions previously left unanswered by the D.C. Court of Appeals:
Does the case-or-controversy requirement apply in D.C. courts and,
if so, what is its source? If statutorily incorporated by Congress in
section 11-705(b), a separate question arises as to whether the D.C.
Council passed a law affecting the jurisdiction of the courts, which
Congress prohibited.116 If adopted by the D.C. Court of Appeals as a
prudential measure, can the D.C. Council overcome it just as
Congress can overcome the prudential standing requirements in
Article III courts?117

110. D.C. CODE § 28-3901 to -3913.
111. See Dist. Cablevision Ltd. P’ship v. Bassin, 828 A.2d 714, 717 (D.C. 2003)
(detailing the purposes of the CPPA).
112. D.C. CODE § 28-3905(k)(1).
113. Grayson I, 980 A.2d 1137, 1154 (D.C. 2009), rev’d en banc, 15 A.3d 219 (D.C. 2011).
114. D.C. CODE § 28-3905(k)(1) (emphasis added).
115. See Corrected Joint Brief of Appellants Alan Grayson and Paul M. Breakman,
Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219 (Nos. 07-CV-1264, 08-CV-1089), 2010 WL 7163426, at *11–12
(arguing that it was “crystal clear” that the D.C. Council intended to remove the
injury-in-fact requirement). Such statutes are known colloquially as private attorney
general statutes because they permit individuals to bring suits typically enforced only
by the government. See Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First
Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 589, 622–30 (2005) (describing the standing
impediments presented by private attorney general statutes in federal court).
116. D.C. CODE § 1-206.02(a)(4); see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
117. Stated another way, is the distinction between constitutional and prudential
standing requirements in Article III courts of any consequence if D.C. courts
prudentially adopted them? See supra note 106 and accompanying text (identifying
the Council’s power to enact statutes overcoming prudential limitations).
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Complainants Grayson and Breakman brought separate CPPA
claims, but both alleged to bring their claims on behalf of the
“general public.”118 Grayson alleged that telephone companies that
had issued prepaid calling cards did not turn over the unused
amounts—purportedly amounting to millions of dollars—to the
D.C. Mayor as required by law.119 Breakman alleged that AOL
charged current and past members double the price for Internet
service that it offered to new members.120 Notably, Breakman did
not allege that he ever subscribed to AOL; rather, he brought the
suit “in a representative capacity on behalf of the interests of the
general public.”121
The trial court dismissed Grayson’s complaint for lack of standing
and failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.122 The
D.C. Court of Appeals in Grayson v. AT&T Corp. (Grayson I)123
performed a short analysis of the standing issue and determined that
the 2000 amendment demonstrated the D.C. Council’s intent to
eliminate the injury-in-fact requirement, meaning that a complainant
need not have personally suffered injury to maintain a suit.124 The
court focused on the fact that the amended section eliminated the
“suffer any damages” language to conclude that a complainant could
bring suit without any injury to himself.125 Additionally, the court
examined subsection 28-3905(k)(2), which states that nothing in the
CPPA prevents a person “who is injured” from exercising other rights
or remedies.126 The court was able to infer a distinction between
subsection (k)(1), which applied to all persons, and subsection
(k)(2), which applied to only those who were injured.127 Asserting
that “this court is not bound by the case or controversy requirement
of Article III,” the court reversed and remanded, holding that injuryin-fact was not required to maintain a claim under the CPPA.128
Breakman’s complaint was also dismissed for lack of standing by
the trial court.129 Described as someone who “has never had a
contractual relationship with defendant” and was not injured
118. Grayson II, 15 A.3d at 227.
119. Id. at 225.
120. Id. at 227.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 227–28.
123. 980 A.2d 1137 (D.C. 2009), rev’d en banc, 15 A.3d 219.
124. Id. at 1154–55.
125. Id. at 1154.
126. Id. at 1154–55.
127. Id. at 1155.
128. Id. at 1155 n.78, 1157–58.
129. Breakman v. AOL LLC, No. 2008 CA 532, 2008 WL 8083443, at *1 (D.C.
Super. Ct. July 28, 2008).
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personally by AOL’s actions, the court easily found that he lacked
standing because he suffered no personal injury.130 The Court of
Appeals in an unpublished memorandum opinion reversed and
remanded, deeming itself bound by the panel’s decision in Grayson I
that injury-in-fact was not necessary for a CPPA claim.131 The Court of
Appeals then vacated both opinions and granted a consolidated
rehearing en banc.132
B. Grayson II Ducks the Question, Throwing Precedent Into Doubt
The D.C. Court of Appeals sitting en banc in Grayson II was
presented with a clear opportunity to settle prior inconsistent
jurisprudence regarding the applicability of standing requirements in
D.C. courts.133 The court recognized the appellee’s argument that
the opinion in Grayson I effectively “rewr[ote] this Court’s standing
jurisprudence” and thus presented “a question of exceptional
importance” worthy of an en banc sitting.134 Nonetheless, the court
completely avoided the standing question and reversed Grayson I. It
did so by resting on shaky statutory interpretation and legislative
history grounds when it held that the 2000 CPPA amendments “do
not reveal an explicit intent of the Council to erase the constitutional
standing requirement to which this court has adhered during the
past several decades.”135
In a footnote, the court’s true motivations for its holding were
made apparent: “Since we conclude that the CPPA retains our injuryin-fact standing requirement, we do not need to address and we take
no position on whether Congress by statute has imposed Article III’s
standing requirement on the local courts of the District of Columbia
through D.C. Code § 11-705(b).”136 By deciding on these grounds,
130. Id. at *5.
131. Breakman v. AOL, No. 08-CV-1089, 2009 WL 4808796 (D.C. Nov. 10, 2009).
132. Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 989 A.2d 709, 709 (D.C. 2010) (en banc) (per
curiam) (consolidating the cases and ordering rehearing en banc). Grayson also
brought a qui tam action under the D.C. False Claims Act. The court in Grayson I
held that the public disclosure bar in the FCA prohibited Grayson’s suit. Grayson I,
908 A.2d at 1153. That portion of the Grayson I opinion was not vacated by the
court’s grant of en banc. Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219, 223 n.1 (D.C. 2011) (en banc).
133. Brief for the Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellants at 9, Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219 (Nos. 07-CV-1264, 08-CV1089), 2010 WL 7163424, at *9.
134. Grayson II, 15 A.3d at 223 n.1.
135. Id. at 224. Interestingly, Judge Inez Smith Reid authored both Grayson
opinions.
136. Id. at 232 n.29. Grayson II also avoided the question of “whether it will follow
the facial plausibility standard enunciated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,” id. at 229 n.16, but
subsequently answered in the affirmative in a panel decision released nine months
later, Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 544 (D.C. 2011).
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the court was able to avoid answering the difficult question that has
troubled D.C. courts for years.137
C. Section 11-705(b) Does Not Incorporate Article III’s Case-or-Controversy
Requirement
Grayson II left a critical and fundamental question unanswered:
Can the D.C. Council pass a statute that does not require injury-infact?138 To answer this question, one must determine first whether
Article III’s standing requirement was statutorily incorporated via
section 11-705(b). If it was, the next question is whether such an
amendment would impact the organization or jurisdiction of the
courts. If not, then the Council does not appear to have any
impediments to enacting the law.139
In full, section 11-705(b) states: “Cases and controversies shall be
heard and determined by divisions of the court unless a hearing or a
rehearing before the court in banc is ordered. Each division of the
court shall consist of three judges.”140 One early commentator
hypothesized that Congress may have created the D.C. courts
pursuant to Article I in order to circumvent Article III’s case-orcontroversy requirement.141 The same commentator implored that
the use of the words “cases and controversies” in section 11-705(b)
“should not be construed to denote the limited category of legal
137. See supra notes 85–102 (presenting the various viewpoints regarding the
application of the case-or-controversy requirement). The D.C. Council introduced an
amendment to the CPPA that would have legislatively overruled Grayson II by permitting a
non-profit organization to bring suit “regardless of whether or not the organization itself
has suffered or would suffer an injury in fact.” Consumer Protection Amendment Act of
2011, B19-0581 § 102(c) (as introduced to the D.C. Council Comm. of the Whole, Nov.
16, 2011), available at http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20111116102513.pdf.
The D.C. Council ultimately passed the amendment but significantly altered the language
to require that the court dismiss any suit brought by a non-profit that “does not have
sufficient nexus to the interests involved.” Consumer Protection Act of 2012, A19-0647 §
2(b)(3) (enacted Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at D.C. CODE § 28-3905(k)(1)(D)(ii)),
available at http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20130118162155.pdf.
138. See Brief for the Legal Aid Society, supra note 133, at 11 (stating that the
question of whether D.C. courts are limited to hearing cases and controversies is a
matter of statutory interpretation, not constitutionality); French, supra note 7, at 273
(“[T]he broad grant of plenary authority over the District of Columbia courts would
allow the Congress to eliminate the requirement of a case or controversy
entirely . . . .”).
139. See French, supra note 7, at 267 (“Only if some specific prohibition is found
upon the exercise of the Council’s power may it fairly be concluded that the Council
is without such legislative authority [to expand jurisdiction beyond cases or
controversies].”).
140. D.C. CODE § 11-705(b) (2001).
141. Williams, supra note 27, at 490 (“The explicit reliance on [A]rticle I in the
designation of ‘District of Columbia Courts’ also may be intended to avoid the case
or controversy constraint placed upon federal court jurisdiction by [A]rticle
III . . . .”).
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business which [A]rticle III of the Constitution describes as being
appropriate for cognizance by federal, constitutional courts.”142 The
argument that the phrase “cases and controversies” does not entail its
Article III meaning and could be substituted with synonyms such as
claims, matters, or disputes without creating any substantive changes
is supported by the legislative history and title of the section.143 In
her separate opinion in Grayson II, Judge Ruiz argued that
subscribing to the case-or-controversy requirement “has been a choice
that the court has made—not a mandate we must follow.”144 This is
supported by the legislative history, which states that “the local
District of Columbia court structure is not bound by the provisions
found in Article III of the Constitution.”145
The legislative history of the Court Reform Act indicates that
Congress intended the local D.C. courts to function analogously to
state courts.146 A near-necessary component of a state court system is
a court of general jurisdiction.147 Although some states do not place
general jurisdiction in one particular court, there is at least one court
available in the state that does have jurisdiction to hear the claim.148
Because all original jurisdiction over local matters is vested in D.C.
Superior Court, it must be a court of general jurisdiction.
The statutory grant of jurisdiction of the D.C. Superior Court
extends to “any civil action or other matter (at law or in equity),”149
while the D.C. Court of Appeals is empowered to hear “all final
orders and judgments of the Superior Court.”150 It stretches
credibility to interpret the Superior Court to hear matters that the
Court of Appeals cannot hear on appeal.151 Likewise, section 11142. Id. at 501.
143. See Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219, 262–63 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (Ruiz, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that “[t]he likely explanation is
that Congressional drafters . . . used the term [cases or controversies] as ‘shorthand’
for ‘appeal’ without realizing its implications as a constitutional term of art”).
144. Id. at 259.
145. S. REP. NO. 91-405, at 18 (1969).
146. See supra Part I.B.1.
147. See Gordon & Gross, supra note 83, at 1163 & n.76 (reporting that almost all
states have a court of general jurisdiction, and those that do not have at least one
court with jurisdiction).
148. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
149. D.C. CODE § 11-921(a) (2001).
150. Id. § 11-721(a)(1); see also id. § 11-721(b) (providing that a party may appeal
any order or judgment of the Superior Court to the Court of Appeals “as of right”).
151. See Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219, 262 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (Ruiz, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (identifying the “truly anomalous and indeed absurd”
interpretation that gives the Superior Court far greater jurisdiction than the Court of
Appeals); Brief for the District of Columbia as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellees and Supporting Affirmance, Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219 (Nos. 07-CV-001264,
08-CV-001089), 2010 WL 7163423, at *5.
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705(b), which refers only to the Court of Appeals, should not serve as
a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.152 The case-orcontroversy requirement was designed to apply in federal courts,
which are courts of limited jurisdiction.153 Applying these same
standards in courts of purported general jurisdiction is inconsistent
with Congress’s intent to create a D.C. court system analogous to
those in the states.154 A literal reading of section 11-705(b) could
produce the result that the Court of Appeals is limited to hearing
cases and controversies only when it sits with three judges, but when
the court sits en banc this limitation does not apply.155 If the word
“unless” in the first sentence is read to negate the “cases and
controversies” language in addition to the “divisions of the court”
language, then this results.156 Nothing explicit or implicit indicates
such a result.157
Additionally, Congress’s treatment of the D.C. Court of Appeals as
a state supreme court for purposes of Supreme Court certiorari158
underscores its intent to create a court system without the constraints
of Article III, including the case-or-controversy requirement.159
Section 11-705(b) covers the organization of the court when it is in
session, the inclusion of the phrase “[c]ases and controversies” does
not provide a substantive limitation on the court’s jurisdiction.160
152. Brief for the Legal Aid Society, supra note 133, at 15 (arguing that allowing
the Superior Court to have greater jurisdiction than the Court of Appeals is not
“sensible”); Response in Opposition to Burger King Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss at 9
n.27, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest v. Burger King Corp., No. 07-CA-003363 B,
2008 WL 6631845 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2008) (contending that a literal reading
of section 11-705(b) would have it apply neither to the Court of Appeals sitting en
banc nor the Superior Court, and therefore implying an intent for all D.C. courts to
be limited to hearing cases or controversies is inconsistent with Congress’s intent for
D.C. court to be analogous to state courts).
153. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)
(noting that federal courts have limited jurisdiction in that they “possess only that
power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by
judicial decree” (citations omitted)).
154. See Williams, supra note 27, at 484 (“The principal achievement . . . after all, is
to create an entirely new local court system of general jurisdiction, independent of
the federal judiciary.”).
155. See Grayson II, 15 A.3d at 262 (Ruiz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (highlighting the incongruous result that panels of three judges would be
under jurisdictional constraints while the en banc court would not); Williams, supra
note 27, at 501.
156. See Response in Opposition, supra note 152, at 9 n.27 (arguing that Congress
should not be presumed to have intended such a result).
157. See Williams, supra note 27, at 501 (“[T]here is no indication, in general
policy or express purpose, of a congressional intent to have ‘cases and controversies’
heard by three-judge divisions, with other court business to be heard otherwise.”).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006).
159. Williams, supra note 27, at 492.
160. Brief for the District of Columbia, supra note 151, at 4.
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The use of the phrase “cases and controversies” is meant merely as a
way to describe when the court is acting in its judicial function.161
The title headings further indicate that Congress did intend
section 11-705(b) to serve as a jurisdictional statute. Title headings
can be used as an interpretive tool to shed light on the meaning of a
section when there is ambiguity or confusion.162 Reference should be
made to titles when the statute lends itself to multiple
interpretations.163 It is clear from four decades of precedent that
section 11-705(b) is far from clear.164
Reference to titles is
appropriate because of the ambiguity surrounding section 11705(b).165 Title 11 is entitled “Organization and Jurisdiction of the
Courts,” section 7 is titled “District of Columbia Court of Appeals,”
and subchapter I is titled “Continuation and Organization.” Section
11-705 is titled “Assignment of judges; divisions; hearings.”166
Subchapter II is titled “Jurisdiction” and contains the jurisdictional
provisions relating to the Court of Appeals. Far from indicating that
Congress intended to incorporate Article III standing requirements
via a nondescript subsection, the titles indicate that section 11-705(b)
was intended to merely govern matters incidental to deciding cases.167
The true intent of section 11-705(b) was to permit the court to sit in

161. See Brief for the Legal Aid Society, supra note 133, at 16 (claiming that the
reference is “purely descriptive”).
162. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29
(1947) (“[The] heading is but a short-hand reference to the general subject matter
involved. . . . For interpretative purposes, they are of use only when they shed light
on some ambiguous word or phrase. They are but tools available for the resolution
of a doubt. But they cannot undo or limit that which the text makes plain.”); United
States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (“Where the mind labours to
discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be
derived; and in such case the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due
share of consideration.”).
163. Bellew v. Dedeaux, 126 So. 2d 249, 251 (Miss. 1961) (“If there is any
uncertainty in the body of an act, the title may be resorted to for the purpose of
ascertaining legislative intent and of relieving the ambiguity.”).
164. See supra Part I.D (chronicling the confusion regarding the meaning of the
section); see also Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219, 262 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (Ruiz, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to title headings of the D.C.
Code to divine the intent behind section 11-705(b)).
165. Cf. 1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 18:7, at 76–77 (7th ed. 2009) (“A statute’s title may not be
considered to determine whether a statute is ambiguous and thus whether courts
may look beyond the language of the statute.”).
166. Brief for the Legal Aid Society, supra note 133, at 16 (arguing that the titles
undermine any argument that the section is meant to constrain jurisdiction).
167. See Grayson II, 15 A.3d at 262 (Ruiz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (imploring that section 11-705(b) is “properly read as an administrative
provision directing the composition of divisions of the Court of Appeals in all cases
other than those that are heard by an en banc court”).
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panels of three judges, not to limit its jurisdiction.168 While the
legislative history is far from dispositive, the titles coupled with an
absence of any reference to Article III standing requirements
necessitates the interpretation that section 11-705(b) did not
statutorily incorporate the case-or-controversy requirement.169
In fact, Congress took pains to note that it was creating the courts
pursuant to its Article I powers in order to free the courts from
Article III’s constraints.170 Although the holding in Palmore only
covered Article III, section 1, there is no reason it should not also
encompass Article III, section 2.171 Additionally, even if Congress
originally intended to incorporate the case-or-controversy
requirement, its continued applicability is not clear. Section 11705(b) was enacted while the D.C. courts were still Article III
courts,172 to which the case-or-controversy requirement does apply.
The courts were later reestablished pursuant to Article I.
Policy rationales that underpin the Article III case-or-controversy
requirement are not present in D.C. courts. The Court has
repeatedly stated that one of the main purposes of the case-orcontroversy requirement is to protect the separation of powers
between coequal branches of government.173 The local D.C. courts
simply are not in the same position to exert influence equal to that
which can be exerted by Article III courts.174 D.C. courts are not
permitted to hear cases that involve many federal issues, as
jurisdiction is granted exclusively to the Article III courts.175 As the
Supreme Court has stated, “the law of Art[icle] III standing is built

168. See id. (referring to these as “procedural provisions”); supra notes 35–40
(discussing the legislative history of the section).
169. See Grayson II, 15 A.3d at 262–63 (Ruiz, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (explaining that “[t]he likely explanation is that Congressional drafters
inadvertently copied the term [cases or controversies] term from an analogous
provision that applies to the federal appellate courts . . . without realizing its
implications as a constitutional term of art”).
170. H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 44 (1969); S. REP. NO. 91-405, at 18 (1969).
171. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing how Congress can legislate over D.C. entirely
free from Article III).
172. See O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 551 (1933) (holding that the
prior D.C. court system consisted of Article III courts).
173. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (discussing the proper, limited role of federal
courts in reviewing acts of the executive and legislative branches).
174. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 581 (1962) (plurality opinion)
(“The restraints of federalism are, of course, removed from the powers exercisable by
Congress within the District. . . . Thus those limitations implicit in the rubric ‘case or
controversy’ that spring from the Framers’ anxiety not to intrude unduly upon the
general jurisdiction of state courts need have no application in the District.” (citation
omitted)).
175. See D.C. CODE § 11-921(b) (2001).
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on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”176 Just as
expanded standing in state courts does not threaten the separation of
powers and the role of the federal executive and legislative branches,
expanded standing in D.C. courts also does not threaten the
constitutional structure of separation of powers.177 D.C. courts do not
stand on equal footing with the federal legislative and executive
branches, therefore they cannot impinge on those branches’ proper
roles.178 The limited geographic reach of the D.C. courts that Justice
Brennan described in Northern Pipeline also means that any abuses of
the restraint function played by Article III will have a limited
impact.179 The legislative history, titles, and policy principles all
indicate that section 11-705(b) does not statutorily incorporate the
Article III case-or-controversy requirement. Therefore, the D.C.
Council can grant standing absent injury-in-fact.
CONCLUSION
The court in Grayson II avoided a question with a potentially wideranging impact. D.C. courts are not the only non-Article III courts of
general jurisdiction. The reach of section 11-705(b) presents deeper
constitutional law issues regarding the extent of Congress’s ability to
confer jurisdiction on non-Article III courts beyond the limits of
Article III. While Congress is the exclusive sovereign in D.C., the
territories exercise inherent sovereignty that was only partially ceded
to Congress. If Congress can create the D.C. courts unencumbered
by Article III requirements, then there is no obvious prohibition on
lowering the jurisdictional bar in these federal non-Article III
territorial courts to usurp the jurisdiction of the local territorial
courts. The territories are not constitutionally differentiated from
D.C., only in the level of sovereignty delegated by Congress.

176. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
177. See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 581–82 (plurality opinion) (stating that the case-orcontroversy requirement was intended to maintain separation of powers only in
relation to federal courts that deal with matters of national concern).
178. While it is true that the D.C. courts’ lack of jurisdiction over federal matters
comes from a statute that Congress could potentially amend and provide another
avenue for Justice Scalia’s alleged improper interference with the executive branch
via the judiciary, this theoretical possibility does not justify the undue limitations it
would place on the courts.
179. See Arthur N. Chagris, Palmore v. United States: The Interrelationship of Article I
and Article III of the Constitution, 23 AM. U. L. REV. 119, 127 (1973) (contending that
the “particularized need” for D.C. courts exceeds the benefits imposed by Article III’s
protections).

